Extortion economies
Documentation of territorial control, renta/extortion systems, and consequences of non-payment, with attention to occupational and geographic risk profiles.
Differentiated analysis of gang-related violence and extortion as non-state actor harm, distinct from state-sponsored political targeting, with focus on Northern Triangle and comparable contexts.
Documentation of territorial control, renta/extortion systems, and consequences of non-payment, with attention to occupational and geographic risk profiles.
Evaluation of police capacity, corruption indicators, and whether state actors are unable or unwilling to control gang violence in relevant localities.
Clear analytical separation between gang predation patterns and state-sponsored political persecution, while addressing nexus theories under PSG and CAT frameworks.
Gang territorial control in the examined municipalities is associated with systematic extortion of small businesses and transport operators. Available reporting indicates that complaints to local police frequently result in either non-response or retaliatory exposure of the complainant.